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Abstract 
The history of the German Blitzkrieg into France in 1940 often looks at the 
German advances as unique and as a surprise to the armies of France and Great Britain. 
This study considers this image in relation to the spearhead arm of the German advances, 
the tank. It examines the theory and doctrine behind the use of the tank in the German 
offensives of 1940, and the origins of these ideas. By comparing developments in 
Germany with its Second World War opponents such as France and Great Britain we see 
that the proliferation of ideas regarding the organization and employment of tanks in 
warfare was widespread. Furthermore, the historical impression of the swift advance of 
German tanks in 1940 as a surprise to the French or British is revealed as problematic, as 
these ideas had been widely explored in these nations throughout the interwar years. The 
exchange of ideas between military thinkers in the interwar period is shown through an 
examination of the published material and modern historical analysis relating to the 




A Note on Terminology............................................................................................4
The Fall of France....................................................................................................7
Chapter One: Historiography...............................................................................................9
Writing about the Fall of France..............................................................................9
Writing about Blitzkrieg as an idea........................................................................17
Chapter Two: 
Maneuver............................................................................................................................23
Combined Arms as The Future..............................................................................23
The importance of Mobility in a war of Maneuver................................................32
Chapter Three: Technology................................................................................................39
The Role of Radio and Communication in the Tank Battle...................................39
Massing Tanks: Essential to Breakthrough............................................................42
Tank versus Anti-Tank...........................................................................................47





In his memoirs of the 1940 German invasion of France, Hans von Luck described 
the French reaction to the rapidly advancing German tanks as nothing short of shock.1 In 
this campaign, von Luck was with a reconnaissance unit spearheading the German 7th 
panzer division, allowing him to directly witness the impact of the mobility-centric form 
of warfare Germany unleashed upon France in 1940. This mobility-centric form of 
warfare has been popularly called Blitzkrieg, and the campaign of 1940 has been 
described as the highest point of the capability of Blitzkrieg.2 Historians, ever since 
fascinated with the rapid collapse of Allied forces defending France, have tried to find 
reasons for France’s defeat, or for Germany’s victory. At the forefront of this rapid 
advance were machines such as tanks, armoured cars, aircraft, and trucks; machines that 
captivated the imaginations of those who still vividly remembered the entrenched 
stalemate on the Western Front in the First World War. The image of the tank in the 
German Blitzkrieg was one of the vanguard of the offensive. Though tanks were not the 
only feature of Blitzkrieg, they were the most important part of it.3 Mass forces of tanks 
were seen to be the leading force of these effective German advances of 1940. For 
Germany and those examining early German victories, the tank provided the keystone to 
these victories. The conventional understanding of the French reaction to the German use 
of tanks was one of shock, of surprise. But was it really a surprise? How well prepared 
were the armies of France and Britain to understand the concepts the German army used 
1 Hans von Luck, Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck (New York: Dell 
Publishing, 1991), 39.
2 Robert M. Citino, Armoured Forces: History and Sourcebook (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1994), 69.
3 Bryan Perrett, A History of Blitzkrieg (New York: Stein and Day, 1983), 69.
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to exploit shock with their tanks? This idea of shock has led to a myriad of historical 
writings on the origin of the German victories, and thus the origin of Blitzkrieg. In trying 
to understand how the German military achieved what it did in the early years of the 
Second World War, historians have dug deep into the development of the German 
military in the interwar period. The history of German military developments as well as 
the reasons for the losses incurred by nations such as France in fighting off the German 
Blitzkrieg have both been explored by historians in order to understand what made the 
Blitzkrieg unique to Germany and its success a surprise to its opponents. What this paper 
aims to do is understand how much the French and British understood the concepts for 
the use of the tank that Germany put into practice in May 1940. Did the French army 
really encounter completely new ideas when German tanks invaded, or did they 
understand these ideas already? By examining aspects of the German Blitzkrieg in 1940 
that are attributed to the employment of tanks, it will be seen that these aspects were not 
new ideas for France or Great Britain. Instead, in many ways the Western Allies 
pioneered these ideas, and it was Germany who learned from their developments and put 
them into practice. In this respect, the German employment of tanks in 1940 should not 
properly be considered a surprise to the armies of France or Britain beyond the military 
application of shock. Rather the surprise may be that Germany managed to put into 
practice these ideas instead of the nations where they were developed.
The tank has its origins in the First World War and as such, by 1940, 
understanding of how to use the tank had seen more than two decades of examination and
experimentation. Much of how the Second World War was fought was influenced by the 
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experiences of the First World War and many of the officers who held commanding roles 
in the Second World War experienced the First World War themselves. Because of this 
many of the lessons learned from the First World War formed the roots of successful 
doctrines of the Second World War. Many of the experiences which informed these 
lessons however, were not shared across states. What the French army learned from its 
battles was not the same as what the German army learned from those same battles. This 
much can be seen easily in studying the analysis of either army of the same battles. What 
is less obvious is how two different armies will come to different conclusions based on 
the same experiences in their experiments with tanks and mechanization both during the 
First World War and after. This is something that will be examined in this paper, as 
France and Germany shared several similar experiences while experimenting with tanks 
in the interwar period while coming to radically different conclusions.
A Note on Terminology
The word Blitzkrieg is a controversial one among historians of the Second World 
War. It is a term virtually unheard of in the German military prior to 1939, with most of 
its more emphatic usage originating in foreign literature after the start of German 
hostilities in 1939.4 It has largely seen use describing German offensive operations from 
1939 to 1941, particularly in relation to he use of tanks and aircraft by the German army. 
For many historians the idea of Blitzkrieg as a specific doctrine is largely a myth, borne 
4 J.P. Harris, “The Myth of Blitzkrieg,” War in History 2:3 (1995): 336.
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primarily from the successes of German troops in 1940.5 Its use among historians has 
varied depending n the individual and the period. Some, notably J.P. Harris, have been 
critical of its use to describe German operations in detail due to not only its lack of 
German military origin, but the vagueness in its meaning.6 Still, the term appears in 
common use even among detailed historical works on the German army of the period. 
The term has largely entered common use for the early offensive campaigns itself, 
particularly 1940, rather than a specific doctrine or ideology. It is with this common use 
in mind that the term is reluctantly employed in this paper. Blitzkrieg is employed here 
not to describe any ideological framework or official practice, but to evoke the impact of 
the rapidity of German operations in 1940. 
Throughout this paper a number of military terms will be used to describe 
elements of armed forces relevant to this study. Military terms vary widely across 
languages and even across time periods and service branches, and as a result there can be 
considerable confusion in comparing these terms. For the purposes of this paper, the 
exact numbers or details of unit and formation sizes, not their specific names in a given 
language are not necessary. Instead, a generic English language set of terms based on 
common American usage will be employed in order to facilitate an easier understanding 
of the concepts. The system in common American use has been chosen due to its ease of 
distinction between various unit sizes and its ease of understanding between these sizes 
and other concepts. Under this system a distinction is made between the terminology of a 
unit and a formation wherein the former is primarily a single-arm organization not 
5 Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure (New York: Stein 
and Day, 1978), 218.
6 Harris, “The Myth of Blitzkrieg”, 338.
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inherently capable of conducting independent combat operations while the latter is 
capable of conducting independent combat operations with attached supporting elements 
such as supply, administration, medical, as well as other combat units. Or in other words, 
a formation can conduct a battle, a unit is attached to other units to create a formation, or 
attached to formations to enable it to conduct a battle. Similarly it must be understood 
that there is a difference between ideas which are discussed as theories by individuals or 
groups, and those that are put into practice as doctrine by an army. Both types of ideas are
discussed in this paper, often alongside each other.
In order to easily differentiate between different sized units, the following will 
outline the generic terms employed in this paper. A division is the standard fighting unit 
of most armies. Most large operations are conducted with divisions, and most combined 
arms formations are division sized in order to provide enough men and material to 
function. A group of divisions is a corps, and a group of corps is called an army, and a 
group of armies is an army group. Going downwards, a brigade is smaller than a division.
A division and a brigade will both be comprised of battalions, which will in turn be made 
up of companies. A division is often also comprised of brigades, or demi-brigades, though
both of these may also be independent. A demi-brigade as it is described in in a later 
chapter, is half as many battalions in a group as a normal brigade. These descriptions and 
terms are not universally applicable in military history, as terminology changes with 
language, nation, force, and time period. However, this rough approach to a common 
terminology aims to keep comparison between ideas simple for the purposes of this 
paper.
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As the technical realities of military machines are essential to understanding these
ideologies it must be noted what is meant by some specific terms which will come up. A 
tank should be understood simply as an armoured and armed vehicle moving on 
caterpillar tracks, capable of moving across many terrains. An armoured car is similar but
on wheels and thus tied more closely to road systems. Cavalry, when referring to a unit 
type, will almost always be referring to cavalry with horses and not machines. Where 
cavalry refers to a tank force taking on a traditional cavalry role, it will be described as 
armoured cavalry. The terms motorized and mechanized are typically used to differentiate
between truck-borne and tracked-vehicle-borne troops, but for this paper will be used 
interchangeably, as their differentiation is irrelevant for the theories discussed in the 
interwar period, and because this distinction is also not universal across the armies 
considered. 
Finally it must be noted that the terms armoured, panzer, and tank when referring 
to organizations such as divisions, are not used interchangeably in this paper. As a term, 
armoured units are defined for this paper as formations having the tank as their primary 
arm, but also with their own supporting arms such as infantry, artillery, engineers, and 
signals attached as a combined arms force. A panzer division is merely a German 
armoured division, and is used to differentiate the German from French and British forces
when discussing them together. A tank unit, such as a tank brigade, denotes a unit 
comprised almost entirely of tanks and attached to other units in order to support them. 
Mechanized and motorized are used largely interchangeably for the purposes of 
discussion here however. The latter two denote units which employ motorized vehicles, 
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whether armoured and armed or not, to provide mobility, but do not emphasize the tank 
as their primary arm. 
The Fall of France
As it is not the goal of this paper to examine the 1940 German invasion of France 
in detail, it will be outlined sufficiently to understand the role of tanks in the German 
army as it advanced through France. The German invasion began early on 10 May 1940 
with one hundred and thirty five German divisions advancing into France, Belgium and 
Holland, split into three army groups.7 The three army groups were arranged in a line, 
with the Northern Army Group B entering Belgium and Holland as a feint attack to draw 
the French and British allies north. The Southern Army Group C would attack the French 
defensive Maginot line in order to keep French attention there. The main thrust would 
come in the centre with Army Group A attacking through the Ardennes forest region. The 
German force numbered ten panzer divisions in total, with three assigned to Army Group 
B in the North, and the remaining seven with Army Group A’s main thrust.8 The Allied 
armies, expecting the main thrust to come through Belgium, advanced the majority of 
their forces north to meet Army Group B.9 Under the Allied plan, the Belgian army would
defend the line of the Albert canal while French and British troops advanced from the 
South and set up along the Dyle river for the primary defensive line, at which point 
Belgian troops would retreat South and link up with allied troops on the Dyle line. As 




part of this operation, the French army Cavalry Corps advanced with regular French 
forces into Belgium as a screening force to the main body of French troops. The Cavalry 
Corps contained the first French armoured formations, the Division légère mécanique, or 
DLM. The DLM were armoured cavalry formations that will be discussed later. When the
Cavalry Corps engaged German panzer divisions of Army Group B in the area of 
Gembloux on 12 and 13 May, the French high command took this as confirmation that 
the primary German thrust was in the north. On 14 May the seven panzer divisions of 
Army Group A began crossing the Meuse river approximately Sedan a day behind 
schedule.10 The French army also consisted of four brand new Divisions Cuirassées de 
Reserve, or DCR, which were to be the first proper armoured formations of the French 
army rather than the much lighter armoured cavalry formations. Three of these four DCR,
which were formed between 16 January and 20 March 1940, were tasked with counter 
attacking the advancing German panzer divisions from 14 to 16 May.11 These divisions 
were not employed as a single group and were, rather, assigned to various infantry corps, 
operating under them. The French armoured division attacks were a disaster. The 1st 
DCR was virtually wiped out overnight on 15-16 May, unable to stop the rapidly 
advancing Germans. The 3rd DCR had its mobile counterattack cancelled by the local 
infantry corps commander and was ordered to be dug in south of Sedan acting as static 
fortifications only to be ordered to counterattack again the next day and was severely 
beaten by German infantry supporting the panzer divisions. The 2nd DCR was moving 




redeployed south to counter the German breakthrough at Sedan. The tanks were 
immediately sent south but nobody bothered to inform the division commander until the 
division arrived at its original destination in Belgium and had to turn back south to get 
their tanks. The fourth DCR was hastily formed on 15 May 1940 under Charles de 
Gaulle, five days after hostilities had begun.
By 17 May the Germans had punched a forty-mile-wide gap in the French lines 
near Sedan.12 French units around Sedan had virtually disintegrated before the advancing 
German panzer divisions, and attempts to counter attack the German forces in order to 
prevent their breakthrough all failed. It was only a matter of days before, on 20 May, 
Heinz Guderian’s panzer corps reached the English channel. In a matter of ten days the 
German panzer divisions had broken through the French border, wiped out most of the 
French army’s independent armoured forces, and driven across France to the English 
Channel. Though the campaign itself lasted a mere six weeks from start to finish, it was 
these ten days that built the image of the German tanks and the shock they brought to the 
French army.
Chapter One: Historiography
Writing about the Fall of France
In his book Machine Warfare, J.F.C. Fuller describes the early campaign from the 
Allied side as foolishly undertaken. He wrote critically of the French operations, stating 
that the French Army had “forthwith set out to commit suicide” in their response to 
German invasion.13 Fuller was clearly unimpressed with the French conduct in 1940. 
12 Ibid, 96.
13 J.F.C Fuller, Machine Warfare; an Enquiry into the Influences of Mechanics on the Art of War 
(London, New York etc.: Hutchinson &, 1942), 122.
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Highly critical of the advance into Belgium, Fuller described the French Army maneuver 
north thus: “the great crustacean unshelled itself and moved forward, a 1918 army naked 
of defences to meet its 1940 adversary clothed in armor.”14 According to Fuller, that 
French and British troops knew before they fully advanced into Belgium that German 
tanks had breached French lines to the south was a critical failure in French command not
following its own doctrine, instead committing itself to an act of suicide by pressing on 
into Belgium.15 These sentiments would be echoed less harshly in Fuller’s postwar study 
The Second World War 1939-45: A Strategical and Tactical History, wherein he attempts 
to provide a thorough examination of the war from his own understanding of modern war.
The book does not criticize the French Army directly, but does make extensive use of the 
same source materials as his earlier work which was critical of the French Army and its 
command.16 Fuller would echo this sentiment in a more subdued way in his later 
publication The Conduct of War, wherein he would shift primarily to a pro-German view 
rather than being critical of French operations.17 Fuller does, however, focus on the 
reporting of a British staff officer for his views, in all three of these books. In this case, 
Fuller recounts the reports of an “Unknown Staff Officer” wherein the French Army is 
described as in utter shock at the advance of German tanks from 14 to 22 May.18 As 
Fuller shares these reports, they are critical of the French Army for its paralysis and 
inability to grasp the idea of a mobile war.
14 Ibid, 123.
15 Ibid.
16 J.F.C Fuller, The Second World War, 1939-45: A Strategical and Tactical History (Cambridge, MA: Da 
Capo Press, 1993), 74.
17 J.F.C Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1979), 259.
18 Ibid, 258-259.
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The criticism of French operations was echoed by others early on, including B.H. 
Liddell Hart. In his postwar book Strategy, Liddell Hart argued that proper employment 
of German tanks resulted in a failure of the French Army to properly respond to rapidly 
changing situations. The breakout of German forces at Sedan allowed the Germans to 
direct their forces into any number of targets, from the Channel coast to Paris and this, 
argues Liddell Hart, caused the French Army to panic.19 The inability of the French Army
to counter the movements of German forces was tied directly to the slowness of their 
timing, being based primarily on a positional method of war.20 This slowness, as Liddell 
Hart describes, spread a paralysis throughout the French Army command system at all 
levels.21 Though likewise full of praise for the German side of the operation, Liddell 
Hart’s condemnation of French operations, like Fuller’s earlier writing, is representative 
of some of the views immediately following the war on the differing capabilities of the 
French and German armies in the first decade following the campaign. As otherwise 
widely read and later widely cited English writers in the very earliest years of analysis of 
the campaign, and with a direct interest in the events, they provide an interesting insight 
into wider views of the French performance in 1940.
In both the instances discussed previously, the French inability to properly 
respond to German mobility due to their use of tanks weighs heavily in analysis of the 
battle itself. Both Fuller and Liddell Hart, seeking to tie their own ideas to German 
successes have sought to balance the capability of Germany with the incapability of 
France. This tendency changed following the end of the Second World War as the 




political climate shifted regarding Germany and its wartime past, and the focus begins to 
be on German operations instead of French operations. This shift will be discussed later 
in this chapter, as criticism of French operations experienced a resurgence in the later 
years of the Cold War. After a period of focus on German capability, historians once 
again began to criticize the French portion of the 1940 campaign. Bryan Perrett, in his 
book A History of Blitzkrieg, focused primarily on German capability while analyzing the
campaign, though careful mention was made of the lack of French capability. For Perrett, 
the inability of French tanks to operate with the freedom, and according to the same 
principles of mass and shock as German tanks appeared to, was key to the French 
defeat.22 The shock factor for the tanks was such that reports of tanks seen would send 
French troops into a panic, even if the tanks seen were French.23 This incapability, tied by
Perrett directly to the refusal of the French Army to heed the advice of the likes of J.BE. 
Estienne or de Gaulle in developing large, mobile armoured formations, was the reason 
for the French failure of 1940.24 In this way Perrett was echoing Fuller and Liddell Hart 
in their early assessments of the French role in the campaign. Though unlike Fuller and 
Liddell Hart, Perrett was not focusing on promotion of their role in developing these 
ideas, but rather as a historical study.
Postwar memoirs of the invasion of France from the German side provided direct 
observational support for the concept of a critical approach to the French actions before, 
and during the 1940 campaign. In his memoirs von Luck recounts hearing French soldiers
declare as early as 17 May, “La guerre est finie, je m’en fou,” only a week after the 




invasion had begun.25 Von Luck was, at this stage, operating to the rear of French forces 
around the French town of Avesnes, having crossed the Meuse river near Dinant in 
Belgium, approximately a hundred kilometres to the East, only three days prior. Erwin 
Rommel described the French reaction to advancing German tanks in similar terms. 
Recounting one event in which a French motorcycle unit ran into his command unit with 
accompanying tanks, he described the French as “so shaken at suddenly finding 
themselves in a German column that they drove their machines into the ditch and were in 
no position to put up a fight.”26 The descriptions of the campaign in Rommel’s 
posthumously released book of the advance through France follow much the same line, 
with many examples of French troops merely surrendering or being too disorganized to 
fight as German tanks advanced.27 Because this book was edited by Liddell Hart, and has 
been questioned by historians since for its validity due to this fact, it should be considered
carefully. Guderian, though substantially more favourable in the limited attention he 
gives to the French Army, cited similar reactions from his interactions with captured 
French officers. At one point, Guderian related the capture of a French order he believed 
came from General Maurice Gamelin himself that declared “The torrent of German tanks 
must finally be stopped!”28 As with early scholarly work on the campaign, the early 
published postwar recollections of German officers tended to be equally critical of the 
conduct of the French army in 1940. This trend has not disappeared, though it has been 
less explicit. Historians such as Martin Alexander have argued that the failure of French 
25 Luck, Panzer Commander, 39.
26 Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), 16.
27 Ibid, 19-22.
28 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 108.
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command to understand the pace of modern warfare led to the inevitable bad gamble in 
committing French troops north into Belgium.29
While it is interesting to examine the history of the 1940 campaign from the 
viewpoint of French failures leading to defeat, it should be noted that France did not 
defeat itself. Historical analysis of the campaign has always had elements both critical of 
French actions and capability, and high in praise for the German aspects. While at first it 
may appear that these two approaches to understanding the events of 1940 are very 
similar, or at the least complimentary, they are in fact quite different in their focus of 
analysis. Where the scholarship described earlier sought to understand why France lost, at
some point this became a secondary concern to understanding how Germany won the 
1940 campaign. This shift gives weight to the idea of a unique German approach to 
mechanized war, to the idea of Blitzkrieg. Why this shift took place and the impact it had 
on historical study of the campaign is beyond the scope of this paper. The shift, however, 
is important in understanding the perception of the use of tanks in scholarly works.
Beginning mainly in the 1960s and running at least until the 1980s there has been 
a trend in viewing the German actions of 1940 as exceptional. This shift follows with the 
global political situation at the time, the growing tensions between the West and the 
Soviet Union, and the reformation of the German military.30 The later, in particular, 
required rehabilitation of the wartime German reputation in order to incorporate German 
troops and experience into the greater military effort against the Soviet Union. It is for 
this reason that in these works German actions were the primary agent of events, not 
29 Richard Carswell, The Fall of France in the Second World War: History and Memory (Cham, 
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 219.
30 Norrin M. Ripsman, "The Curious Case of German Rearmament Democracy, Structural Autonomy, 
and Foreign Security Policy." Security Studies 10:2 (2000): 27.
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French actions. There are a number of factors which influence this model of examination 
of the campaign. One important factor which shows up in the scholarship is the 
widespread availability of German source material. German officers widely published 
their memoirs in the 1950s, and in many cases these were taken at face value by 
historians and those writing about the history of the 1940 campaign. Fuller, in his 1961 
book The Conduct of War favoured the German side of sources more heavily than in his 
1948 book The Second World War. For the former book, Fuller relied almost entirely on 
Guderian’s memoirs as the source on the 1940 campaign, with little effort to broaden the 
source base as he would do with other aspects of the Second World War.31 For the earlier 
book however, Fuller relied heavily on news reports, official documents, and personal 
statements from French and British officers, as well as Allied analysis of German 
capability, with far less emphasis on German sources themselves.32 This is perhaps 
understandable given that English language translations of many relevant German 
sources were not available until the early 1950s.33 Liddell Hart would likewise follow a 
similar trajectory. For Liddell Hart, however, praise of German actions had a direct link 
to his own claims to influence those successful German actions.34 Besides assigning 
himself credit for the ideas behind the German operations in 1940, Liddell Hart’s 1954 
book Strategy described the campaign in terms of the impact and use of shock by the 
German army to defeat France.35 For Liddell Hart, the French defeat was not related so 
31 Fuller, Conduct, 256.
32 Fuller, The Second World War, 70-82. See footnotes describing the fall of France without a single 
German source reference.
33 Guderian’s Panzer Leader was first published in English in 1952, The Rommel Papers were published 
in English in 1953.
34 Azar Gat, British Armour Theory and the Rise of the Panzer Arm: Revising the Revisionists 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 44.
35 Liddell Hart, Strategy, 225.
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much to French preparedness, or capability, but to the superior use of shock by Germany, 
particularly in preventing action by the French. Once German tanks crossed the Meuse 
river, argues Liddell Hart, they caused a breakdown in French response because they 
were poised to advance in a number of directions.36 The French lost because the German 
army could strike anywhere in France from then on. An organized defence was thus 
impossible, and the French army crumbled before the advancing German tanks.
In a more applied approach to the campaign, retired British Army Brigadier 
Richard Simpkin took this approach further in his analysis of tank warfare. Writing in the 
1970s Simpkin’s works were historical for practical application in the Cold War as part of
understanding how to fight the Soviet Union better. For Simpkin, the best lessons to be 
learned from the 1940 campaign were the lessons which led to victory, and therefore he 
was primarily interested in the German actions. Simpkin’s description of the German 
victory lies entirely in the German use of shock. First, Simpkin asserts that taking of 
“unacceptable risks” by German tank officers, particularly Rommel, during the campaign 
was a significant gamble which paid off greatly in 1940.37 While Simpkin acknowledges 
that these risks were contrary to German training and doctrine at the time, they were 
essential to the German victory. By undertaking the unexpected, officers such as Rommel
were able to surprise French forces.38 This was important according to Simpkin because 
Germany was not able to counter an enemy which could withstand them on an equal 
footing, and thus relied on shock to attain victory.
36 Ibid, 231.
37 Richard E. Simpkin, Tank Warfare: An Analysis of Soviet and NATO Tank Philosophy (London; New 
York: Brasseys; Crane Russak, 1979), 9.
38   Ibid, 45.
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More recent scholarship has taken a more complex and nuanced approach to the 
1940 campaign. Though both sides have individually received more detailed attention 
from scholars, the trend has been to focus less on the specific failures or unique greatness
of either side, but rather to take a holistic approach to understanding the campaign. In his 
books The Breaking Point and Seeds of Disaster historian Robert A. Doughty outlines the
failure of the French army in properly fighting the German invasion without the earlier 
emphasis on the French army being to some degree incompetent. Doughty is critical of 
the French army, its command, doctrine and operations, while also being critical of the 
previous scholarship to focus on the French side of the campaign. With regard to Fuller’s 
analysis of French army performance, Doughty argues that Fuller incorrectly understood 
the role of tanks in the campaign dismissing the more important role of German infantry 
and artillery and ultimately forming an incorrect assessment of French tanks in 
response.39 Doughty agrees with Fuller, and others’, assessment that France was 
unprepared to fight a mobile war in 1940.40 The particular reasons why France was 
unprepared to fight a mobile war are discussed in Seeds of Disaster, where Doughty 
breaks down the development of French doctrine in the interwar period. To summarize, 
Doughty asserts that French doctrine set out to conduct a methodical battle of position, 
where every aspect was carefully planned and conducted according to that plan. The 
faster tempo and unpredictable nature of the German invasion caused the French army to 
be paralyzed in its decision-making capability, and thus unable to properly resist the 
invasion. He argues that because the collapse occurred primarily in French sectors, and 
39 Robert A Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, Connecticut: 
Archon Books, 1990), 324.
40 Ibid, 325.
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because Germany was much better prepared for the war itself, France was very clearly 
not prepared to fight the kind of war Germany wanted to.41 He wrote of this: “The 
complete collapse of the French army in 1940 demonstrated that it had failed to prepare 
adequately for the demands of modern warfare… [France] was prepared to fight precisely
the type of war that Germany wanted to avoid.”42 Julian Jackson, in his analysis of the 
failure of the French army to properly meet the German challenge, identified failures in 
the French intelligence service in properly identifying the main thrust of German forces.43
Further to this, Jackson has asserted that the French army was well aware of the 
possibility of a German advance through the Ardennes region with armoured forces, even
going so far as to indicate the French army accurately predicted the amount of time such 
a move would take as early as 1938.44 Instead the failure of the French army in this case 
was not the lack of foresight, but the inability to properly address this issue due to 
sending the strategic reserves required to do so north into Belgium based on faulty 
intelligence. While still critical of France, this no longer held France to be incompetent, 
rather the failures of the French army were not unique to France.
Historians of the German military have likewise been kinder to France’s 1940 
performance in attempting to explain the German successes. James Corum, for example, 
argues that the French army was frozen in 1918, with a strong emphasis on the power of 
defence from generals such as Philippe Pétain.45 This left interwar French army training 
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inadequate to prepare troops for a modern war of mobility. Further, Corum argues that the
French army, having amassed the largest tank force of the First World War, had so many 
obsolete tanks following the war that they dictated French doctrine development. This 
was not, however, the case with Germany, which had had its tanks banned by the 
Versailles treaty.46 Robert Citino has asserted that the French army was so ill prepared for 
mobile warfare that by the time German tanks emerged from the Ardennes forest on 12 
May 1940, Germany had already won the campaign. It did not matter then that the French
55th and 71st divisions facing the German tanks around Sedan panicked.47 In his detailed 
analysis of the German aspect of the 1940 campaign German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser
has been kind enough to attribute German successes more in line with unexpected events 
and good luck than French failures.48 The role of unexpected events and luck has taken 
more prominence in understanding the 1940 campaign in the decades since the 1970s.49
 Writing about Blitzkrieg as an idea
With the success of German offensives in 1939 and 1940 it became an important 
topic among some theorists to emphasize their contribution to the German capacity. In 
writing of the actions of German tanks in 1940, Fuller described them in terms directly 
linked to his Plan 1919. The German operations, he claimed, took their inspiration from 
his plans, and thus he can be seen as attempting to establish an early link between British 
theorists and the successful German operation.50 While Fuller is important to consider 
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here because his 1932 work Lectures on F.S.R. III: Operations Between Mechanized 
Forces formed the basis for another publication in 1942 titled Machine Warfare in which 
he sought to explain German success and how to defeat Germany through his own 
proposals, the key player in this period was Liddell Hart. While Machine Warfare would 
quote Lectures on F.S.R. III heavily, it would also draw from Fuller’s experiences with 
Germany since 1932, and particularly from reports from the Second World War itself 
which Fuller employed to favourably promote himself as intellectual originator of the 
very concepts Germany employed in 1939 and 1940.51 It has conversely been argued that 
Fuller’s influence had largely waned by the 1930s, leaving German doctrine based on the 
theories of Liddell Hart.52 Liddell Hart’s early writing on armoured warfare has been 
described as virtually identical to Fuller’s, with historian Azar Gat arguing this is due 
largely to Liddell Hart’s adoration of Fuller in the 1920s.53 Liddell Hart, however, would 
endeavour to place himself as a major influence on German military thought through the 
defeated German officers themselves. Through publication of the memoirs and papers of 
some of the major German generals associated with Blitzkrieg, largely edited by Liddell 
Hart in their English releases, he ensured he was credited directly in the postwar 
narrative.54 Though this credit has come under scrutiny since the 1980s, which will be 
discussed later, for much of the Cold War Liddell Hart’s influence was accepted as a fact. 
The major document which provides the evidence for Liddell Hart’s influence is the 
English translation of Guderian’s autobiography Panzer Leader, which describes Liddell 
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Hart as a primary influence on the ideas Guderian espouses within the book.55 This 
translation of the original German book gave weight to Liddell Hart’s own indirect claim 
to influence provided in his study of strategy which included in depth examination of the 
1940 campaign. In his book, Strategy, Liddell Hart emphasizes the British origins of 
German theory, without reference to specific names.56 This mention is followed by praise 
for Guderian and his implementation of these British-originating ideas as Liddell Hart 
analyzes the campaigns of 1939 and 1940. Strategy largely served to provide Liddell Hart
with an avenue to prove his theories of warfare with hindsight to the Second World War. 
Historians since have likewise repeated this claim that Guderian gave Liddell Hart the 
title of “father of mechanized warfare” by merely accepting at face value the claims of 
Liddell Hart and Guderian.57
Cold War military analysis of the 1940 campaign, rooted primarily in the 
contemporary threat of the Soviet Union in Europe, would adopt this understanding of 
Liddell Hart’s influence as well. Writing a series of books on the future of warfare 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Simpkin would carry the association of Liddell Hart
as ideological originator of the Blitzkrieg through several works as he examined the 
lessons of 1940 in order to postulate how to defeat the Soviets. His work Tank Warfare, 
which as a military theory document is similar to Guderian’s Achtung-Panzer! and 
Fuller’s Lectures on F.S.R. III in that it primarily deals with how to fight a war, includes a
historical examination of the German successes of the early Second World War.58 This 
sentiment is likewise repeated in his book Mechanized Infantry, where Simpkin considers
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the role of modern mechanized infantry in a potential war with the Soviet Union in the 
era of atomic weapons.59 As well, in 1985 Simpkin published a more radical analysis and 
proposition to future combat titled Race to the Swift, where he carried forward the idea of
Liddell Hart’s influence on German developments.60 Simpkin’s carrying forward of 
Liddell Hart’s contribution to German theoretical development was one of necessity 
rather than academic malfeasance. As Simpkin wrote for military theory his works were 
not within the realm of academic history, and as such he drew on the existing work of 
historians in order to provide military analysis of the Blitzkrieg, and thus provided 
another avenue for the historical analysis of this subject to be considered. Simpkin’s main
contribution to the study of Blitzkrieg lays in the focus on contemporary military lessons 
to be learned, as he provided a fresh lens through which academic historians could 
consider the evolution of the concept. Simpkin’s reliance on a contemporary, 
professional, relationship to the history of the idea of Blitzkrieg can thus be understood as
building upon the ideas of the interwar years for their original purpose. Because of this 
Simpkin argues for a comparative approach to understanding the underlying theories that 
would be referred to after the Second World War as Blitzkrieg, in order to better 
understand their employment in modern military settings. Further to this, Simpkin’s work
in understanding Soviet theoretical developments of “Deep Battle” in order to better 
combat the USSR in the Cold War provides a wider base of understanding through which 
he interprets German theory and its application in his analysis.61 Simpkin thus provides a 
59 Richard E. Simpkin, Mechanized Infantry (London; Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Defence, 1980), 13.
60 Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-first Century Warfare (London; 
Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Defence, 1985), 17.
61 Richard E. Simpkin, and Erickson, John. Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii 
(London; Toronto: Brassey's Defence, 1987), 252.
24
broader comparative element in order to understand the 1940 campaign, though through 
the lens of military action in the Cold War and not necessarily historical analysis.
In the 1980s, academic trends shifted away from the idea that a few individuals 
were responsible for the development of the theories which would take German tanks 
into France in 1940. In 1988, John Mearshimer published a scathing examination of 
Liddell Hart’s relationship to German Generals such as Guderian in the postwar period, 
creating a shift away from the idea of Liddell Hart as a major influence. Mearshimer’s 
work deals primarily with Liddell Hart inserting himself into the memoirs of German 
officers through favours and other contributions to them and their families in order to be 
given credit as an influence to their successful actions in the Second World War.62 As such
Mearshimer’s contribution to the study of interwar tank theory is less direct, as he 
provides the impetus to examine German theoretical development in more depth without 
focus on Liddell Hart, and later without focus on the other major postwar name 
associated with the subject: Guderian. Scholarship which has since followed Mearshimer,
such as Corum’s study of German armoured doctrine has tended towards treating the idea
that German interwar theory development was directly taken or inspired by British 
developments as a misconception.63 Much of Corum’s work in this regard is undertaken 
in order to correct this misconception.
The emphasis on the originality of German theory development has led historians 
to reevaluate Guderian’s claim to be sole creator of tank theory in Germany. Corum’s 
work, for example, has considered the head of the Reichswehr in its early years, Hans 
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von Seeckt, as a much more influential figure in this regard. For Corum, viewing 
Guderian as the sole originator of German interwar tank theory, fighting against a 
conservative and reactionary high command staff in order to push revolutionary new 
ways of war is a complete misconception.64 Corum argues that Guderian’s writing was 
limited to only a few articles prior to 1937, that his own contributions are greatly 
overblown compared to the prolific writings of theorists such as Ernst Volckheim or 
Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger, upon whom Guderian relied heavily.65 In this way 
Corum argues that Guderian built himself up as ideological originator, while blatantly 
ignoring those from whom he built his ideas in order to better promote himself.66 This 
emphasis on Guderian, especially in the early years of scholarship on the subject, stems 
primarily from Guderian’s own autobiography taken at face value, rather than more 
detailed research.67 Other historians have examined the relationship between British, or 
even French, theorists and German tank theory development as well. Richard DiNardo, 
for example concluded there was little if any foreign influence on German 
developments.68 Instead, DiNardo asserts that the methods which Germany employed in 
1940 were derived primarily from German experiences in the latter half of the First 
World War, and were a natural extension of that period.69 There is a continuation of 
thought from the First World War to 1940 for DiNardo, which does not indicate either 
British influence or even a primacy of Guderian in developing these theories. Others have
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of its employment. In his brief assessment of the development of interwar tank theory in 
Germany, Simpkin implied Beck, not Guderian, was primarily responsible for the 
creation and employment of the panzer divisions.70 Gat has examined Beck’s role, and 
though he does not discount Beck as a major driving force to the creation and training of 
the German tank force, he neither brushes aside Guderian.71 Eimannsberger has also 
received recent attention among scholars outside of Germany as a major influence on 
German tank theory development. Eimannsberger was an Austrian general who would 
later join the German army.72 A major proponent of the idea of combined arms, 
Eimannsberger was widely published in German military publications. Citino describes 
him as the “best-known tank writer in the 1930s” in Germany.73 
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Combined Arms as The Future
The higher-level consideration of the employment of tanks comes down to two 
important elements which must be considered. The first element is the role the tank, and 
other mechanized arms, can play in a combined arms endeavour, and how tank forces as 
either independent arms or subjugated to another arm, can operate within it. The idea of 
combined arms operations, employing various arms of an army such as artillery, infantry, 
cavalry, etc. in concert in order to facilitate success on the battlefield was something that 
all combatants of the First World War had come to understand as an important element of 
modern warfare. This had been made clear by the end of the war through the cooperation 
between artillery and infantry, and in some cases with tanks and aircraft as well. The 
second element which must be considered is the role of mobility in the outcome of 
operations. Here, as will be discussed below, is where the armies of Europe began to 
differ, both in their experiences in the First World War, and in their conclusions of how to
fight a future war.
The German panzer divisions as they were organized in May 1940 were formed as
combined arms units based around the tank as their primary striking force. They 
consisted of four tank battalions, with three infantry battalions, an anti-aircraft battalion, 
an anti-tank battalion, an armoured reconnaissance battalion, and three artillery 
battalions, plus other attached units.74 As the battalion was the primary fighting force of 
the division, it can be clearly seen that the emphasis in numbers was on the tank units. 
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The combined arms approach employed in 1940 sought to employ this mixture of unit 
types to best effect against their enemy. Germany certainly managed to place more of 
these divisions into combat in 1940 than France and Britain, so it is important to consider
the origins of the idea of such a unit in order to understand how and why this was the 
case.
The 1917 battle of Cambrai involved a force of nearly four hundred tanks, 
attacking with total surprise early on the morning of 20 November.75 The battle followed 
the advance of the British tanks, through the stunned German lines along the first day at 
an unprecedented speed. Citino has described this first day as the most successful tank 
attack of the war.76 German defenders in many, though not all, objectives of the British 
advance were unable to resist the advancing tanks and their supporting infantry. Many 
German units retreated or surrendered, and “a huge hole, six miles wide and three miles 
deep, was torn” through the German lines in a day.77 This was unprecedented in the 
preceding months and years of the First World War. The exploitation of this hold had 
been assigned to horse mounted cavalry, however they were unable to act and ultimately 
failed to exploit the successful penetration.78 By the end of November German 
reinforcements had managed to retake the original German lines by use of similar tactics 
of surprise but without the use of tanks. The battle of Cambrai is a pivotal moment in the 
development of British tank operations. It has gone down in history as proving the worth 
of the tank in a massed attack, operating in a combined arms fashion with infantry, 
artillery, and aircraft. However, unlike the later German panzer divisions, the operations 
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at Cambrai were focused on the striking power of the infantry and artillery, with the tank 
force merely supporting them.79 In Britain, the idea of a combined arms force based 
around the tank formed early in the tank program itself. In his memoirs Fuller relates that 
the idea of “tank armies” consisting of some five hundred tanks and an array of 
motorized supporting units including infantry and artillery was proposed as early as 10 
December 1917.80 Though he does not elaborate much further, he does ascribe this 
proposal not to himself, but to Sir Eustace H. T. d’Eyncourt, who had been chairmen of 
the Landships Committee, the group which developed the first British tanks.81 Though 
this proposal would not bear fruit, the underlying idea of employing tanks as the primary 
arm, supported by other arms motorized in order to keep pace with the tank would form 
the basis for Fuller’s Plan 1919. Plan 1919 was the planned operation for the summer of 
1919 to defeat Germany and prevent the war being dragged into the 1920s. Though the 
First World War would come to a close before the end of 1918 and ultimately Plan 1919 
would not be employed, it is interesting to consider in how it outlined the role of 
supporting arms. First, the plan called for the employment of more than five thousand 
tanks over a front of only 80 kilometres, broken up into three primary groups built around
the capability of the tanks: breaking force, disorganizing force, and pursuing force.82 The 
breaking force would include the main infantry attack, supported by artillery and aircraft, 
and rely on large numbers of tanks in order to break the German lines.83 While this 
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certainly constitutes a combined arms force, it does not necessarily mean one using the 
tank as its primary arm. For this we must look to the disorganizing force, which Fuller 
outlines as operating on the mobility of new medium tanks. In Fuller’s description, the 
disorganizing force would operate as “Armoured Independent Cavalry”, and conduct 
deep attacks on German communications and command centres after the breaking force 
opened the German line. In order to accomplish this, the disorganizing force requires 
supporting arms in engineers, signals, infantry, artillery, and even supply all provided 
with their own motorized transport capable of keeping up with the new medium tanks.84 
This force would never be more than a paper example as the war ended before it could be
constructed and employed, but it shows a serious application of a tank-centric combined 
arms force at the end of the First World War. This idea would not be seriously considered 
again in Britain until the mid 1920s with the creation of the Experimental Mechanized 
Force.
In 1927 the British Army established an Experimental Mechanized Force for the 
purposes of trialling the roles and capabilities of such a force in modern warfare. Though 
the formation of this force was limited by a shortage of vehicles, both armoured and 
unarmoured, the force was established along the following lines: a reconnaissance 
battalion, a tank battalion, a machine gun battalion, three batteries of artillery, and 
attached companies of engineers and signals troops.85 This unit lacked motorized infantry 
support, but did carry other arms motorized to keep up with the tank force. One of the 
original proposals for the experimental force, however, did include three motorized 
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infantry battalions, providing a fully mechanized force though not a tank-centric one.86 
This experimental force ran for 1927 and 1928 and provided the British Army with 
valuable lessons on the role of the tank in modern combined arms. Ultimately the British 
Army would conclude that the experimental force proved the need for an armoured 
brigade that would contain many of its supporting arms but which could be attached to an
infantry division with artillery to provide a mobile striking force.87 This of course does 
not follow the established tank-centric force we would ultimately see in in Britain by 
1939 , however that was not the only lesson of the force. In 1934 a “mobile division” was
proposed following the lessons of the experimental force and built around a brigade of 
tanks, a motorized cavalry brigade, three battalions of motorized infantry, and other 
motorized arms such as artillery.88 Instead the 1st Tank Brigade would be permanently 
established in 1934, employing radios and mobility for their shock value.89 The 
Experimental Mechanized Force and later 1st Tank Brigade can thus be considered the 
direct ancestors to the combined arms armoured divisions that would be formed later.90 
Ultimately this force structure would not be immediately adopted, but it does provide 
perspective in the lessons taken from the British experimental mechanized trials. It would
not be until 1938 that a proper combined arms unit with tanks as the primary arm would 
be established in Britain.91 This force, developed from the tank brigade established 
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following the experimental mechanized trials, would in 1939 be redesigned as an 
“Armoured Division”, the first in the British Army.92
The French experience with tank-centric combined arms units would differ 
significantly from either the German or British experiences. Though the French tank 
force would come out of the First World War with similar experiences as the British 
regarding the massed use of tanks and their employment as the primary arm of an armed 
force, they would ultimately not retain their independence or carry these lessons forward. 
The French tank attack at Soissons in 1918 carried with it several similarities to the 
British attack at Cambrai a year earlier. First, it involved a combined arms attack with 
tanks leading infantry and cooperating with aircraft and artillery.93 Second, it struck an 
undeniable blow against the German Army with its shock and surprise.94 Third, it was an 
infantry-centric operation just like Cambrai.95 This action would not, however, provide 
the impetus for the salvation of the French tank force as an independent  arm, and it 
would be subsumed under infantry control after the war.96
In 1932, the first proper combined arms unit based on the tank to be seriously 
considered by the French Army was field tested in order to determine its validity.97 This 
was not the first time the idea was proposed, however. Estienne had proposed large, 
combined arms units at least as early as 1920, and although ultimately unsuccessful in 
gaining support for this idea, he was very vocal about it until his retirement.98 Estienne 
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was instrumental in the creation of the French tank force during the First World War, an 
association that would earn him the nickname “the father of the tank”.99 He would hold 
the position of inspector of the tank force through much of the 1920s, though his 
influence would wane following the First World War. Estienne’s influence can be seen as 
waning as early as 1922 when despite his protests the French army tank arm was 
subsumed into the infantry branch as a dependent arm, rather than the independent arm 
he had pushed for.100 This idea would come up again a few years later in 1927, and be 
proposed to the French Army High Command, though not seriously considered.101 None 
of these proposals would spur any serious consideration. Doughty has argued that part of 
the reason the idea of large combined arms formations was not seriously considered by 
the French Army at the time came down to the lack of sufficient medium tanks which 
could be employed by such a formation, while the light tanks of the infantry support units
were the most numerous of the French Army.102 The light tanks were destined to support 
the infantry units in their operations. As Doughty points out, the infantry remained the 
primary branch of the attack in the French Army throughout the interwar period, and as 
such taking tanks assigned to support the infantry in order to create a dedicated combined
arms unit was not considered a good use of resources in the French Army High 
Command.103 In 1932, however, the idea went as far as field tests, which would ultimately
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reinforce the supporting role of the tank to the infantry in the eyes of the French Army 
High Command.104
Though the 1932 field tests were a failure in the eyes of the French Army, they 
did not deter further examination of the concept of large, combined arms units. In 1934, 
de Gaulle published his book Vers l'Armée de Métier in which he outlined his idea for a 
professional combined arms force to be built around the tank as its primary arm. De 
Gaulle’s fully professional force comprised six “divisions of the line” and would form the
mobile backbone of the French Army. Each division would comprise one brigade each of 
tanks, motorized infantry, and motorized artillery, and have at its disposal some 500 
tanks.105 These divisions would not replace the masses of conscripts that made up the 
French army but would instead serve as a quick reaction force to allow time for French 
reserves to be called up. The mobility afforded by the tank, and mechanized supporting 
arms, provided the option to conduct offensive strikes in the earliest hours of a potential 
war when the enemy would not be prepared for them.106 De Gaulle based the method of 
operation on what he saw as the “great cavalry of olden days”107 in that these independent
forces could conduct unexpected, sudden and violent blows, returning the idea of surprise
to the French Army.108 De Gaulle’s ideas would ultimately be rejected by the French 
Army, not on the soundness of his ideas regarding combined arms and massed tank 
employment, but on his insistence in the use of a professionally manned force.109 For the 
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French Army, at the time built upon a system of reservists and conscripts on short 
contract, the idea of a professional force in addition to the main conscript force created 
tension and the idea of the formation of a politically dangerous elite within the army.
The French Army would finally create large, combined arms formations, based on
the capabilities of the tank, starting in 1935 with the cavalry Division légère mécanique, 
or DLM.110 The DLM is controversial in terms of the study of armoured warfare in that, 
as Kiesling puts it, it mirrors the composition and capability of the German panzer 
divisions of 1940, but are often not considered as similar when approached by 
historians.111 The DLM would come into existence mere months before the first three 
German panzer divisions, though it would not be until 1940 that a real French armoured 
division was formed.112 
The formation of the first German panzer divisions caused a stir in French Army 
High Command and a new examination of the concept for the French Army. In 1936 
Gamelin ordered a study to be conducted on the creation and employment of armoured 
divisions for the French Army.113 Proper armoured divisions in the French Army would 
not be formed along the lines proposed earlier by de Gaulle or Estienne, but rather much 
more limited and tied to a supporting role for the infantry on a grand scale as the DCR. 
The DCR, proposed initially with one demi-brigade each of light tanks, medium tanks, 
and motorized infantry, plus motorized supporting forces, were intended to operate in 
support of larger infantry based formations such as corps or armies, by employing their 
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mobility and mass in support of the main infantry effort.114 In this way they would be laid 
down along the lines stipulated in the failed 1932 trials, and the subsequent and also 
failed 1933 trials which convinced the French Army High Command not to pursue large 
combined arms formations initially.115 The hasty nature of their organization and the lack 
of proper support elements within the French Army for these divisions weighed 
considerable problems upon them, however. These new divisions lacked support 
equipment such as transporters and anti-tank guns, and when they were formed, their 
commanders were poorly trained and understood little about how to properly employ 
their forces, with possibly the exception of de Gaulle commanding the 4th DCR, as he 
held practical experience in the employment of armoured forces.116
Germany was not among the most prominent proponents of independent tank 
forces coming out of the First World War. Though German ideas behind combined arms 
forces would be in place as early as the First World War itself, and officially adopted 
early on by the postwar Reichswehr, the force would still be based on the infantry, not the
tank.117 The emphasis on independent mobile forces would be placed primarily on 
cavalry, as German experiences in the East had taught them the value of independently 
operating combined arms groups built around the highly mobile cavalry.118 This would be 
seen as so crucial that the Reichswehr would ignore restrictions on cavalry units imposed 
by the Versailles treaty, doubling the size and capability of their cavalry units and adding 
a wide array of highly mobile, motorized supporting forces such as infantry, artillery, and 
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signals units.119 For the Reichswehr, forbidden from possessing tanks at the time, cavalry 
was the way of the future, and the future of the cavalry was “all arms light divisions for 
independent operations.”120 However, it is not likely the German army stuck with the 
combined arms cavalry concept because of the perceived merits of the cavalry. In the 
early 1920s German officers observing French and British exercises concluded that 
mixing horses with mechanized units was unlikely to be a successful approach to future 
war.121It is from this combined arms cavalry focus that the interwar German army would 
build its successful tank force, with the emphasis on mobility and the benefits of 
mechanization to that emphasis being established with the means available to Germany 
under the Versailles Treaty.
By the 1930s any pretense of following the Versailles treaty limitations had been 
abandoned, and Germany was pursuing a tank development program. With this program 
came reexamination of the capability of the tank, and its role in combined arms. In 
analyzing the British tank attack at Cambrai in the late 1930s, the German army came to 
the conclusion that tanks, though useful as the main force, should not be employed 
without mechanized supporting forces.122 In reevaluating Cambrai, the German army 
concluded that the ultimate failure of the British tanks in that battle lay not with the tanks,
but with British high command, which did not properly support the tank force in order to 
achieve victory.123 It is at this point that the tank begins to replace the cavalry as a 
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decisive mobile arm. Eimannsberger’s analysis of tank warfare in 1934 would emphasize 
this mobile role and replacement, arguing that the flow of battle in a tank-based army 
would be faster and thus provide more rapid decisive victory if properly employed.124 An 
attack with tanks, operating as a combined arms unit, would employ shock and surprise in
order to attain victory faster than a traditional infantry and artillery-based attack, in much 
the same way cavalry could achieve such surprise. Eimannsberger was well versed in 
Fuller’s ideas at this time, though he was critical of many and sought instead to apply the 
lessons of the First World War in the East to the technology of the West.125 By 1936 the 
official German army manual for the use of tanks would include these ideals, though still 
as a supporting force to the infantry.126 In this manual, cooperation with aircraft and the 
employment of masses of tanks on a narrow front to force a decision in battle were also 
discussed, much as would be undertaken by the German army a few years later in 1940. 
This approach closer to combined arms as would be seen in 1940 was not emphasized as 
heavily as support of infantry operations, though the seeds of combined arms are there.
The importance of Mobility in a war of Maneuver
One of the primary reasons Fuller believed the tank represented a revolution in 
warfare was due to the mobility it afforded. For Fuller, because the tank could move 
across country virtually unimpeded, it brought land combat more in line with naval 
combat. Tanks would allow men protected by armour to fire from a moving vehicle, 
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while manoeuvring in any direction bound by roads.127 This allowed the tank attack, 
which would be conducted through surprise by movement, to have greater impact on the 
battlefield than any other arm before it. For Fuller, the speed of movement was not 
important, but rather the creation of unexpected situations through the ability to move 
counter to what the enemy expects.128 For Fuller this mobility is fundamental to the tank, 
and permeates every facet of his writings on military theory.
The French army came out of the First World War with an understanding of 
mobility in warfare quite different from that of the German Army. Whereas German 
officers learned the value of mobility from actions on the Eastern Front, French 
experiences were dictated by the most important six letter word of the war for the French 
army: Verdun. The battle at Verdun became what Citino calls “a symbol of French will, a 
living, breathing manifestation of the French soul.”129 It is possible to argue that the 
experiences at Verdun for the French army demonstrated the superiority of defensive 
warfare, and thus led the French army to sit behind its fortified defensive Maginot line in 
1940.130 This simplistic argument ignores the vital lesson the French army put into 
practice throughout the interwar years, that firepower is the most important aspect of 
battle.131 And while Verdun was important for the German army as well, Citino describes 
the German operations of 1940 as an “anti-Verdun.” For example, they could draw on 
experiences the French army could not, or would not.132 For French and British officers 
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fighting the First World War the experiences were more static at the operational level 
unlike the more operationally mobile Eastern Front experiences of their German 
counterparts.133
The French methodical battle approach, which they employed in 1940, was not 
intended to involve sitting in static positions and waiting for the enemy to attack. While 
the French army considered firepower to be the greatest tool for victory in battle, 
mobility was not ignored. Rather mobility was essential for victory as the relatively static
initial battle, methodically planned and executed to maximize firepower, must transition 
to a mobile offensive or it would be unable to decisively defeat the enemy force.134 The 
French army was aware of this, and it was reflected in their doctrine and training manuals
of the time. Further to this, mobility was key to initiating the methodical battle, as the 
French army heavily invested in mechanization of its troops in the interwar period. In 
order to effectively counter a predicted German advance through Belgium, the French 
army concluded it must be able to rapidly move troops, weapons, and supplies into 
Belgium.135 This is not the emphasis of an army stuck in the past and wishing to fight 
from within static fortresses, and as can be seen differs little superficially from the 1940 
German approach of rapid movement of troops and weapons. Fundamentally, however, 
the French army intended to employ mobility in order to fight a war of position, not of 
maneuver.136 French forces would employ mobility primarily to attain a position from 
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which to withstand German forces. Mobility was only a means to an end, not the goal 
itself. 
Where the French army differs from the German army in doctrine of mobility is in
the role and employment of the tank within this framework. French troops, rapidly 
advancing into Belgium in order to initiate a carefully planned methodical battle, would 
require tank support during their rapid advance.137 This led the French army to employ, as
part of the cavalry, tanks in highly mobile units. The role of these tanks in enhancing the 
mobility of French troops must be considered, despite their difference in final role to 
similar German forces of 1940. Useful in order to get to the position wherein the army 
would conduct its carefully planned battle, once the battle had begun the tanks posed a 
problem for the French army. Experiments in the 1930s left the French army with the 
conclusion that the higher mobility of tanks on the battlefield left them vulnerable to 
outstripping the infantry they were there to support.138 Tanks, then devoid of the infantry 
they were supposed to aid, were left to either slow down their mobility and become easier
targets for enemy anti-tank weapons and artillery, or drive around pointlessly as they 
waited for the infantry to catch up.139 Further to this, because every aspect of the battle 
was to be carefully planned, there was no room for initiative on the part of French 
officers. Tank units could not exploit local successes even without their infantry, nor 
could they alter the plan to fit the tactical situation.140 For these reasons the French army, 
though recognizing and embracing the value of mobility in achieving victory, did not 
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place emphasis on the tank as the weapon to bring about victory through mobility in the 
same way that the German army did. 
That the French Army did not embrace mobility through the tank as doctrine does 
not mean that it was neither proposed nor considered. De Gaulle’s 1934 book Vers 
l'Armée de Metier caused substantial uproar in French military and political circles, and 
had at its core a proposal for highly mobile tank-based forces to conduct war via 
maneuver, not position. De Gaulle recognized that in order to be effective as a fighting 
force, tanks must not be bogged down in dealing with fortified enemy forces unless it was
essential to the restoration of mobility.141 Instead, these impediments to the mobility of 
the tank forces were to be dealt with by supporting forces such as infantry, and bypassed 
by the tanks where needed in their advance to their ultimate objectives in the enemy rear 
areas. This reality came from the same experiments the French army had just conducted 
with tanks, but whereas the army had concluded that battlefield mobility of tanks was a 
liability, de Gaulle had concluded that it was the greatest asset. This approach is so 
similar to the ultimate German employment of tanks in 1940, particularly among the 
rapidly advancing German tank divisions, that Robert Citino has described it as “the 
seeds of Blitzkrieg.”142 This is of course no coincidence, Fuller himself gives de Gaulle 
credit for Guderian’s ideas alongside his own influence.143 Guderian as well cites de 
Gaulle’s work on armoured warfare in his own work Achtung-Panzer! alongside a 
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number of other works discussed in this paper.144 As Fuller’s influence can be seen deep 
in de Gaulle’s proposal, this claim however is no surprise coming from Fuller himself.145
General Estienne, father of the French tank force himself, would likewise push for
the usefulness of the tank’s mobility until his death in 1936.146 For Estienne, maneuver 
and firepower together were the keys to victory, and the tank was the instrument of this 
through its superior mobility.147 Estienne’s influence was lacking by the 1930s however, 
and ultimately his advocacy was not as successful as even de Gaulle’s for greater 
emphasis on mobility.
In contrast to the lessons the French took from the First World War on mobility, 
the German army concluded that mobility was the key to future successes. This is not 
surprising as many of the German generals of the 1940 campaign had spent the First 
World War on the Eastern front where wider spaces and more open front lines meant 
maneuver was the primary tool of victory.148 These are notable as, just like the French 
experience at Verdun, the German army drew from its successes in the East and compared
them to its failures. In 1914, the German 8th Army managed to almost completely destroy 
a Russian force nearly twice its size through superior mobility by rail to rapidly position 
and support its artillery force.149 In 1915, as part of the minor Gorlice offensive the 
German 11th army spent six weeks advancing at more than six miles a day while fighting 
Russian forces.150 These events, set in contrast to the negative experiences of the Western 
144 Guderian, Achtung-Panzer, 213. Also cited by Guderian are works by Eimannsberger, Martel, and 
Fuller.
145 Searle, Armoured Warfare, 36.
146 Gale, French Tanks, 14.
147 M.P.M Finch, "Outre-Mer and Métropole French Officers' Reflections on the Use of the Tank in the 
1920s," War in History 15:3 (2008), 301.




front for the German army, provided German officers analyzing the First World War with 
a strong lesson in the superiority of mobility and a war of maneuver. As James Corum 
puts it, “the experience of the eastern front, where well-trained, well-led, and well-
equipped Germans had consistently defeated larger enemy forces convinced von Seeckt 
that numbers were no longer the key to victory,” but maneuver and mobility were now 
seen as such.151 Von Seeckt, the man James Corum argues is responsible for the German 
army that would defeat France in 1940, would state after having analyzed these battles, 
that “the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employment of mobile 
armies.”152 Clearly the German army wanted to avoid a repeat of Verdun, or the Somme.
While the German tank force of the First World War was small, and did not 
operate in the East, there are a few notable examples of mobility through mechanization 
that are pertinent for later German operations. In late 1916, shortly after the British 
debuted the tank on the Western front, in operations in Romania a mechanized unit based 
around an infantry battalion under the command of a Captain Picht undertook a fifty-mile
advance in secret, outflanking Romanian defenders with complete surprise. The attack 
succeeded: Picht’s force overran Romanian forces on the objectives then managed to fend
off attacks by numerically superior Romanian forces until relieved by conventional 
German units. James Corum likens this to the larger scale mechanized maneuvers of the 
Second World War, some thirty-four years later!153 The value of mechanization and the 
decisiveness of mobility was immediately apparent to German officers according to 





the war wherein deep advances as far as forty kilometres occurred using highly mobile 
combined arms units, as examples of the immediate impact of these lessons.154 Likewise 
the postwar Reichswehr placed early and heavy emphasis on armoured cars and tanks, 
both weapons it was forbidden by the Versailles Treaty, in future operations.155 These 
machines would replace the horse mounted cavalry in German use almost completely. 
These events all show how integral the concept of mobility had become to German 
officers, and how they took vastly different lessons than their French counterparts from 
the First World War. German officers viewed the French lessons as inflexible, and were 
unimpressed with French mechanization maneuvers in the early 1920s.156 Victory lay not 
in defeating an equal enemy one for one, but in employment of shock and speed through 
mobility of the tank.157 It is this lesson from the First World War that, for many, set 
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Chapter Three: Technology
The Role of Radio and Communication in the Tank Battle
Understanding Fuller’s Plan 1919 and his later radical ideas on how tanks would 
revolutionize warfare requires understanding the issue of communication. Radios on 
tanks were not new, they had been trialled in limited numbers in the First World War. 
However wireless communication was required for rapidly changing battle situations. For
Fuller, the primary target of armoured forces was the command structure of an enemy 
army. If one could cut off communication from command to troops in the field, Fuller 
believed that army would be paralyzed.158 He described it as such: “intimate connection 
between will and action, and that action without will loses all co-ordination: without an 
active and directive brain, an army is reduced to a mob.”159 Plan 1919 devoted 
considerable energy and time to the idea that defeating enemy communications defeated 
the enemy strategy.160 He likened this idea to shooting an enemy soldier “through the 
brain” in that, according to Fuller, it would cause the immediate collapse of the German 
army, especially if applied at the operational levels from division  and corps.161 This was 
applied to the British Experimental Mechanized Force in 1927-1928 by employing 
dedicated radio vehicles, though the ultimate conclusion was that messengers on 
motorcycles were faster and more efficient than radio.162 In practice during maneuvers  
the Experimental Mechanized Force found that the rapidly changing nature of high speed 
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operations with tanks required far greater detail and clarity in messages than could be 
provided by written orders over signals, and voice radio was still in its infancy. Because 
of this the Experimental Mechanized Force operated with dedicated messenger officers 
who could provide a clearer understanding of the force commander’s intent. Sir Gifford 
Le Q. Martel attributes this in his experience with the force as possible due to the 
peacetime nature of the trials. For Martel, the fact that these maneuvers were done in 
peacetime, when “bridges and roads cannot be destroyed” meant that couriers would 
always get through.163 In addition to this, due to not taking casualties the constituent units 
of the force had officers to spare for courier duties and as such the courier method was far
more successful in these particular maneuvers. Even so, radios proliferated down to the 
company level for all formations, and one tank company was trialled with radios in every 
tank.164 Despite problematic lessons regarding fast paced communication for tanks in 
combat conditions it was understood thus that communication, especially the ability to 
rapidly communicate changing realities of battle, was an important factor of mobile 
warfare.
In France in 1940 however, tanks were rarely equipped with radios.165 This lack of
radios contrasted with the widespread German use of radios and caused considerable 
differences in the ability of the French army to react to changing battlefield situations. 
The German army, with its commanders forward, given tactical freedom to achieve their 
objectives and supported by radios, were better able to adapt to the rapidly changing 
realities of battle. French commanders, in contrast, were removed from their front lines 
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by their doctrine, often not trusting the reports that came in of German maneuvers due to 
the rapid obsolescence of reports in the constantly changing battlefield situation, and thus
were stagnant in their ability to command.166 This was not without debate however. De 
Gaulle argued in 1934 that radio communication was needed for a mechanized army 
because such an army required constant communication and updates for flexibility.  He 
said of this aspect of warfare that “there can be no satisfactory liaison without a network 
of wires, of light-beams and of wireless communication.”167 De Gaulle explicitly believed
that, for battlefield communication  “the developments of wireless telegraphy are making 
all other means of communication obsolete.”168 It is for this reason that de Gaulle 
emphasized enemy communications and command facilities as the primary targets for his
armoured force.169 De Gaulle also realized that the mobile battlefield would change 
rapidly, and determined, as the German army had, that radios were required in every tank 
in order to allow adaptability.170 This was because, as Citino puts it, tanks allowed the 
force to be “freed from dependence on roads,” thereby allowing the force to “choose its 
point of attack at will, striking unexpectedly to shatter the morale of the enemy.”171 The 
battle of the future would be too mobile to rely on wired communications or dispatch 
riders with mail; it would require accurate means of signalling via radio.172 By using radio
the majority of communications could be by spoken word, allowing rapid and simple 
interpretation, with little room for misunderstanding.173 Ultimately de Gaulle’s proposal 
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was not adopted, and General Gamelin did not provide his subordinate officers 
instructions to adapt to the missions they had, whereas German officers had far greater 
flexibility in this respect with their superior communication options.174
While for Germany the number and types of signals units, those employing radios
and telephones for communications, were severely limited by the Versailles treaty, their 
importance was so clearly recognized that the Reichswehr began to actively ignore that 
part of the treaty as early as 1923.175 The Reichswehr knew how important 
communication would be in future wars of mobility, and began to attach mobile radio 
units to its cavalry units immediately after abandoning the limit set out in the Versailles 
treaty.176 Volckheim, in pushing for combined arms units built around the tank, argued 
that communication was the single greatest tactical problem experienced by German 
tanks of the First World War.177 He wrote here from experience, arguing that every tank 
should be equipped with a radio so that it could communicate with other tanks, or with 
infantry, artillery, or even aircraft in order to achieve coordinated success and thus 
decisive victory.178 From early on the German army tank doctrine development 
proponents found the idea of armoured units operating without radios in every vehicle 
simply unthinkable.179 This would be emphasized heavily upon witnessing French tank 
maneuvers in 1923, where the most critical assessment of French performance by 
German officers was the lack of communication capability for individual tanks.180 It was 
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clear right away that communication was key to operation of tanks, and 1940 would show
how true this was.
Massing Tanks: Essential to Breakthrough
The impact of large numbers of tanks concentrated against a specific target on the 
capability of a defending army is an important component of the German 1940 campaign.
The difference in focus between Germany and France in their concentration of tanks on 
the battlefield has been seen by historians as one of the major factors in Germany’s 
victory over France in 1940.181 This is not to indicate that the idea was unique to 
Germany, but rather that for the campaign only Germany employed it successfully, if at 
all. Instead it should be understood that the role of massed tank forces can be broken 
down into two main approaches separate from the idea of combined arms units or large 
independent armoured formations discussed earlier: those focused on a narrow front for 
breakthrough, and those focused on a wide front. The former must be understood as a 
traditional element of the German approach to war, rather than a new concept introduced 
between the First and Second World Wars.182 The campaign of 1940 was not the first use 
of massed tanks concentrated on narrow objectives however, nor was it merely the 
product of traditional German military thought applied to the tank. As will be seen the 
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approach to focused tanks attacks saw considerable debate among the major powers of 
the interwar period.
In order to understand the impact of massed tank forces in the attack it is essential
to go back more than two decades prior to the 1940 campaign, into the last two years of 
the First World War.  For many in the interwar period the British tank attack at Cambrai 
in November of 1917 formed the basis for understanding and supporting the idea of 
massed tank forces in combat in order to achieve a breakthrough and ultimately decisive 
victory. Not only British theorists like Fuller, who was keen to emphasize his role in 
planning the Cambrai attack after the war, but German, Austrian, and to a lesser extent 
French and Soviet examinations took careful study of the battle. For the British Army the 
attack at Cambrai primarily provided proof that surprise could be achieved through the 
use of tanks in a modern battlefield restricted by artillery, machine guns, and 
fortifications.183 Though this belief in Cambrai as proof of the utility of tanks in massed 
attack as a weapon of shock was widely held, it was not universally held.184 Despite the 
debate, the future of warfare as seen by the British Army immediately following the First 
World War was heavily shaped by the consequences of the battle of Cambrai being 
incorporated into training material as early as 1920.185 
The lessons Cambrai provided for the British Army can be distilled down to two 
main elements. The first element, which has been discussed, is the role of combined arms
in a successful campaign, though early British conclusions on the battle were that 
combined arms operations were a subject far from being mastered. The second element 




was the employment of tanks on a narrow point of focus, or the decisive point of battle, 
after attacking a wider front in order to achieve surprise regarding on the exact point of 
penetration.186 For both of these elements the overarching feature is surprise. From his 
early writings on the role of the tank in warfare Fuller argued that surprise was the most 
important weapon in war.187 Surprise, for Fuller, attacked not the weapons or 
fortifications of an army, nor its supplies, but the morale of the soldier. Morale, as he 
describes it, “is the most precious virtue which a soldier can possess,” and as such is the 
most important element to victory in battle.188 For Fuller, and the British Army 
immediately after the First World War, the most important aspect of surprise was 
“surprise by novelty of action,” or shock.189 Shock, directed towards an enemy force 
command structure would decide a battle more surely than numbers of men or weapons. 
Though it was ultimately not achieved in the battle of Cambrai, this notion of shock as a 
decisive element of battle was, for the British, in many ways clearly shown. Fuller’s early
proposals on the employment of tanks, for which he uses as proof the attack at Cambrai, 
see the tank as the primary method of shock, both in the initial attack and breakthrough, 
and through the exploitation phases of the battle.190
The German approach to the massed use of tanks in the interwar period consisted 
of much debate on the usefulness of the idea. For Germany, the experience of the First 
World War was that of the defender, fighting off the massed use of enemy tanks at battles 
such as Cambrai or Soissons, and this coloured their analysis of these battles. For 
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Cambrai in particular, the Germans did not fully understand the lessons to be learned 
during the war, and this shaped their understanding in the interwar years.191 The initial 
German views of the battle downplayed the role of shock via the focused employment of 
tanks in creating an initial success, rather arguing in favour of the German counterattack 
in the later period of the battle which ultimately led to German victory. This, according to
Alaric Searle, may have been motivated by promoting the “stab in the back” myth and 
downplaying the lack of German focus on tanks in the war as a potential criticism of 
German military performance.192 This debate over the analysis of the battle of Cambrai 
would prove contentious within German military thought throughout the interwar period, 
with articles as late as 1939 being published in the German General Staff Journal arguing 
that viewing Cambrai as a German success would lead to the wrong lessons being 
learned.193 The correct lessons, of course, would be the focus of large numbers of tanks in
the attack.
Though as early as April 1918 Fuller reported reading German assessments of the 
battle of Cambrai which focused on the importance of shock and the role of the tank, it 
would not be until the end of the 1920s that German military theorists openly analyzed 
the battle in this way.194 The earliest German thoughts on the employment of tanks, 
notably by Volckheim, largely ignored the wartime actions of tanks while focusing on the
theory.195 By 1929 however, the official German history of the First World War had 
shifted focus towards the role of the tank, the shock of the attack, and the conduct of 






battle envisioned by Fuller in its examination of the battle of Cambrai, rather than the 
German counterattack.196 This development is important for a number of reasons. First, it 
shows a clear shift in thinking in Germany towards the lessons of Cambrai. Second, it 
shows clearly the extent to which Fuller was an influence not only for information on the 
battle but the lessons to be learned. Third, it opened the debate on what lessons, both 
correct and incorrect, were and could still be learned from the battle. For Germany, this 
last point included how the German Army’s incorrect analysis of Cambrai may have 
skewed its expectations of the rest of the war. Despite this shift in open discussion of the 
impact of Cambrai, German military thinkers immediately following the First World War 
were well aware of the importance of massed tank attacks in future wars. The first official
doctrines on the use of tanks for Germany, published in 1920, emphasized the very same 
lessons which would later be attributed to Cambrai: large numbers of tanks employed on 
a wide front, but focusing on narrow points of penetration.197 The envisioned employment
of tanks at this stage was still, however, in support of the infantry. This would be repeated
as late as 1936, with tanks being left subordinate to the infantry.198 By the mid 1930s 
cooperation with aircraft and other arms would receive more focus.
Though skeptical of the conduct of the battle, Eimannsberger included Cambrai in
his analysis of tanks in the First World War. The British objectives for the battle, argued 
Eimannsberger, were too ambitious, and the British lessons of the battle too weakly 
adopted.199 For Eimannsberger, the breakthrough phase of battle with tanks required a 
wide front in order to succeed in attaining surprise, while focusing on narrow 
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penetrations of an enemy line to actually achieve decision through the exploitation 
phase.200 This is not unlike the approach to breakthrough by tank proposed by Fuller. 
Volckheim would echo these conclusions, though by 1939 he would push further to argue
that Cambrai had proven that Germany needed tanks, and could have won the war with 
sufficient numbers of them.201 This idea held favour among several German general 
officers of the First World War in the later 1920s as well.202 Along with Volckheim’s more
vocal stance by the end of the 1930s, the General Staff Journal of the Wehrmacht had 
begun publishing analysis of Cambrai with focus on the role of massed tanks and their 
shock value in achieving a decisive battle.203 The most well-known German theorist to 
discuss the role of tanks in the interwar period, Guderian, likewise concluded that the 
mass employment of tanks at Cambrai and their shock value, were among the most 
important lessons to learn.204
Tank versus Anti-Tank
An important element of modern tank-centric warfare which dominated much of 
the thinking on how tanks could be used in the interwar period is the role of anti-tank 
forces. Anti-tank guns in this context are direct fire artillery that are often towed, but not 
fully armoured like a tank. In the first half of the twentieth century anti-tank guns were 
primarily a defensive weapon, towed or pushed into a position and concealed in order to 
engage tanks. The French army believed the anti-tank gun’s capabilities precluded mass 
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employment of tanks and prevented the kind of operations that Germany would undertake
in 1940. In their analysis of the capabilities of anti-tank guns, the French army argued 
that tanks would never be able to advance in open terrain against anti-tank guns due to 
the latter’s far longer engagement range and high rate of fire.205 For this reason the mass 
employment of tanks, and large tank formations, was considered unlikely to succeed well 
into the 1930s. Though this attitude was not universal. De Gaulle for example 
emphasized that the ability to mass tanks on a narrow objective meant the anti-tank gun 
was less effective as a deterrent to tank operations, and thus the anti-tank gun 
emplacement was more likely to be overrun.206 Still, this attitude prevailed.
In contrast to the French attitude towards the anti-tank gun, Germany was perhaps
more realistic. Unlike France, Germany had practical experience with anti-tank guns and 
their employment from using them in the First World War. As a result German 
assumptions of the capabilities of anti-tank guns were far less ambitious than their French
counterparts, and their conclusions favoured the tank’s offensive capability more 
frequently.207 Even with this advantage, the German army concluded from analysis of the 
First World War that a properly concealed anti-tank gun such as in a town or village had 
an advantage over tanks when properly employed.208 Key to this is proper employment of
the anti-tank gun, with which Germany had substantial experience. A dedicated, 
organized anti-tank gun practice was organized under Crown Prince Ruprecht in 1918, 
who began to study and test the best use of these weapons.209 Of interest to the 
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employment of anti-tank guns by Germany is that, by 1918, the German army had 
determined that the ideal method of employment was to mount anti-tank guns on trucks 
so they could move freely about the battlefield.210 Giving anti-tank guns mobility would 
take a leap forward in capability immediately after the First World War as Volckheim 
would emphatically argue for the use of tanks as the primary anti-tank weapon, instead of
anti-tank guns.211 For Volckheim the primary role of the tank was to destroy other tanks, 
and once that was done they could conduct operations against targets to aid the infantry, 
such as machine guns and entrenched infantry, much in the same manner as the primary 
target for artillery had become enemy artillery and only after it had been neutralized were
secondary targets such as fortifications to be engaged.. This idea was based on his own 
experience with German tanks in the First World War, as he saw the vulnerability of the 
anti-tank gun as a problem. Eimannsberger would repeat this sentiment in 1934, 
emphasizing that the tank should act as the primary anti-tank weapon due to its protected 
mobility.212 Further to this, Walter Nehring, who Searle argues was a major influence on 
Guderian, argued in the 1930s that the growing capability of anti-tank guns did not 
outpace the growing capability of tanks, and that both were essential for a proper 
combined arms approach.213 Among the Germans, there is a clear trend toward 
downplaying the capabilities of the anti-tank gun over the tank as compared to the 
French. This difference in faith in the capabilities of anti-tank guns led to a clear 
difference in understanding of the capabilities of the tank in leading the attack, and in 
conducting a battle via maneuver.
210 Corum, Roots of Blitzkrieg, 124.
211 Ibid, 128.
212 Searle, Armoured Warfare, 37.
213 Ibid, 38.
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Germany’s Voracious Appetite for Information: Learning from Abroad
What did German theorists actually know about foreign developments and ideas? 
This has been explored by historians ever since the Second World War, both by 
examining what was published or translated into German, and what German officers 
themselves participated in. The German army general staff began bi-weekly publishing of
foreign works from America, Poland, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and others 
as early as 1925, often with input from Volckheim.214 The German army had a voracious 
appetite for foreign information on the use of tanks and collected every bit of information
they could. Translation of press reports on developments and foreign maneuvers and in 
some cases in-person examination and observation of foreign maneuvers were undertaken
enthusiastically.215 In 1926 Fuller’s The Reformation of War was translated into German 
in a three part series for the general staff, which provided his earliest major examination 
of the future of warfare with tanks.216 Likewise in the early 1920s Fuller’s Tanks in the 
Great War was translated into German, and was used as a textbook by the early 
Reichswehr.217 Fuller’s memoirs, which included detailed information on his Plan 1919 
for use of tanks against Germany in the First World War, was translated into German very
quickly after it was published. It is no wonder, then, that Fuller was cited by Guderian 
and Eimannsberger as a source, and that his influence can be seen in later writings by 
Volckheim.
214 Corum, Roots of Blitzkrieg, 131.
215 Searle, Armoured Warfare, 39.




In examining the successes of the German Blitzkrieg of 1940, it is useful to 
remember that Germany did not operate in a vacuum. As can be seen through 
examination of the various concepts of the use of tanks in the Blitzkrieg, it was not 
unique, nor was it unexpected. It is clear that the German army of 1940 had a stronger 
grasp of the importance of all these concepts than the British or the French did in 
execution. This can be clearly seen through the rapid victory Germany attained and the 
myth that was created in its wake. The German army simply put these concepts into 
practice better than its opponents, in many cases despite the clear advantage in 
experimentation and theoretical development those opponents had in developing and 
implementing those concepts.
As we have seen, the idea of independent tank forces able to operate within 
combined arms formations was widely experimented with. Combined arms units were the
backbone of the 1940 German panzer divisions, with tanks supported by motorized 
infantry, artillery, and other troops in order to maintain rapid movement. For Germany, 
France, and Britain, the idea of combined arms stems from the First World War. The 
British with their experiences at Cambrai ultimately pushed a more integrated approach 
for Plan 1919. In 1927, a fully mechanized combined arms force was trialled by the 
British army, leading to the creation of brigade and later division sized units. The positive
French experience at Soissons would not be repeated in postwar trials however, and 
despite strong efforts by theorists such as Estienne and de Gaulle, the French Army 
believed combined arms was a problematic concept because tanks would get too far 
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ahead of the infantry. It would not be until 1935 that the French army would create its 
first combined arms divisions. Shortly afterwards when Germany created its first panzer 
divisions the French army command reevaluated its tank forces, ultimately creating four 
armoured divisions that fared poorly in 1940. The German army conversely took its 
experiences with truck-based arms, cavalry, and the more fluid conditions of warfare on 
the Eastern front of the First World War and focused on the use of mobile combined arms 
forces until it could begin preparing for and using tanks again.
A key advantage that the tank has over other arms is the mobility it provides to a 
protected platform providing high firepower, and this mobility was the subject of much 
consideration throughout the interwar period. German tank successes are widely known 
for their mobility, as in the infamous race to the channel in May 1940, which cut off 
Allied troops in Belgium. But as we see, this mobility was emphasized very early on by 
Fuller because as he saw it, it allowed the principles of naval combat to be brought onto 
land. The French conversely learned from their experiences in the First World War, 
particularly at Verdun, that firepower reigned supreme over mobility. Mobility was 
important to position troops rapidly, but the battle would be conducted not by maneuver 
but by methodically planned fire. The high mobility of the tank was seen as a detriment to
this battle, rather than an asset. Despite this official line, the idea of mobile armoured 
forces were heavily promoted throughout the interwar years by French theorists Estienne 
and de Gaulle, often to deaf ears in the French army high command. Finally, the German 
army, known for the employment of mobility in the 1940 campaign against France, is 
shown to have an established history of not only mobile operations but mechanized 
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mobile operations even in the First World War. Extending these principles forward to 
1940 is not really a stretch of the imagination.
. The differences in employment of communications, particularly radios, was of 
vital importance for the results of 1940. Whereas the French army placed very little 
emphasis on radio communications, the German army understood from the First World 
War that mobility required efficient communication. De Gaulle understood this as well, 
though he was unsuccessful in persuading his superiors. Likewise, British army 
experiments concluded that radios were not useful as other methoeds of communication 
in the explicit environment of the peacetime experiments. De Gaulle and the German 
army were ultimately proven correct in the ability of a mobile force to respond to rapid 
changes if it could communicate much faster by radio.
We also see the widespread understanding of the utility of massing tanks in the 
attack, though Britain and France ultimately decided not to follow through on their 
experiences, despite the protests of thinkers like Fuller and de Gaulle. Germany embraced
the concept wholeheartedly, and it paid off in 1940. For the French army, the idea of 
massed tanks was seen as a problem because it determined that anti-tank guns rendered 
them useless. The German army, having had experience with anti-tank guns, had a much 
more realistic vision of what anti-tank guns were actually capable of, and determined 
mass tank attacks were ideal. This was pushed further into the idea that other tanks, not 
anti-tank guns, were the best anti-tank weapons.
From examining these aspects of the employment of tanks in battle we can see 
that German ideas were not unique. In 1940 the German army clearly put these ideas into 
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practice far more effectively than the French or British, and the results show the price of 
this. But it is also clear that France and Britain were not only aware of these concepts, 
they had explored their use themselves. Did the French army fail to stop the German 
invasion because it was surprised by the way Germany used its tanks? It could not have 
been, as nothing about the employment of German tanks in 1940 was new to the French 
army. Indeed, France had played a pioneering role in the development of many of these 
techniques. The failing in the French army lay not in its inability to look forward enough 
to develop modern concepts of tank warfare, but in its inability to accurately assess some 
primary aspects of warfare which dictate the use of tanks. The French army had the same 
information regarding the capabilities of mechanization the German army did, it just 
made different judgments based on different experiences.
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